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CHILDREN’S INTERESTS AND INFORMATION DISCLOSURE: WHO
PROVIDED THE EGG AND SPERM? OR M OMMY, WHERE (AND WHOM)
DO I COME FROM?
NAOMI CAHN1
INTRODUCTION
As we celebrate the possibilities of reproductive technology and adoption
in allowing some lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) families2 to
raise children, I want to look at one particular angle of children’s interests in
these intentional families: the ability to receive information about their genetic
background. Many LGBT families are intentionally formed through either
adoption or through the provision of sperm or eggs from known or unknown
providers.3 In adoption, there are generally only three or four “parents”: the
adoptive parent(s) and the biological parents. The adoptive parents raise and
nurture the child, and over the past 40 years, there has generally been little
contact between the biological parents and the child. In contrast, children created
through the new reproductive technologies, could conceivably have at least eight
different “parents”: two intending parents; a sperm provider (with a partner); an
egg provider (with a partner); and a surrogate (with a partner) who carries the
egg. 4 Assuming that all goes as planned (not a safe assumption in all cases, of
*

Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School.
I thank Tony
Gambino, Patricia King, Nancy Polikoff, Joan Schaffner, Sonia Suter, and Bob Tuttle
for their comments, and to Michelle Wu and Zeena Abdi for research assistance.
Special thanks to Helen Colebrook, Law Commission of New Zealand. And thanks to
the organizers of The Georgetown Journal of Gender and the Law’s Third Annual
Gender, Sexuality and the Law Symposium, Beyond Biology: Adoption, Reproductive
Technology, and Intentional Families, where this talk was originally presented.
2
For a class-based analysis of who in the LGBT community can raise children, see
Terry Boggis, First Class: Economics and Queer Families, in HOME FRONTS:
CONTROVERSIES IN NONTRADITIONAL PARENTING 117, 119-20 (Jess Wells ed., 2000);
see also Catherine DeLair, Ethical, Moral, Economic and Legal Barriers to Assisted
Reproductive Technologies Employed by Gay Men and Lesbian Women, 4 DEPAUL J.
HEALTH CARE L. 147, 160-62 (2000) (discussing economic barriers). Although the term
family can mean many things, I will generally use it in this article to refer to
intergenerational relationships.
3
Other families, of course, are formed when a lesbian or gay parent leaves a
heterosexual relationship. Kate Kendall suggests that it is only during the past decade that
lesbians have begun to see themselves as both lesbians and as parents outside of
heterosexual familial relationships. Sarah Schulman, Kate Kendall Wants Lesbians to
Keep Their Promises, in HOME FRONTS: CONTROVERSIES IN NONTRADITIONAL
PARENTING 69, 70 (Jess Wells ed., 2000).
4
Dr. Machelle Seibel has identified 16 ways to create a baby, depending on how
fertilization occurs, who contributes the gametic material, and who carries the child.
M ACHELLE M. SEIBEL, FAMILY BUILDING THROUGH EGG AND SPERM DONATION:
M EDICAL, LEGAL, AND ET HICAL ISSUES, xiii, xiii-xiv (Machelle M. Seibel & Susan
Crockin, eds., 1996). Professor Vivienne Adair has developed a useful chart on the
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course), the intending parents raise the child, and the sperm and egg providers,
together with the surrogate, disappear without interfering in the parent/child
relationship. 5
What happens, though, when the child – now an adult – wants
information about birth parents or gamete providers? We are painfully aware of
the dangers in this country of using “known” sperm donors: they may return and
assert paternal rights to the child notwithstanding an agreement not to do so. 6 I
do not know of any such cases involving egg donors, but I am sure they are out
there. The surrogacy cases present a somewhat different situation because the
surrogate becomes pregnant. Nonetheless, given the well-publicized examples of
breakdowns in these cases, egg donor cases are certain to occurThus, information
disclosure seemingly affects families created by both known and unknown
donors.
Without some means of terminating the parental rights of sperm or egg
providers, problems can arise with identified donors.7 For example, in a few
states, it may be possible for a known gamete donor to waive parental rights
through contract, but the long-term enforceability of such an agreement remains

different possible social and biological relationships with the intending parents who use
donor gametes. Vivenne Adair, Redefining Family: Issues in Parenting Assisted by
Reproduction
Technology,
at
http://www.aifs.org.au/external/institute/afrc6papers/adair.html
(last
visited
Feb.
21,
2001). Lesbian and gay families may have four intending parents: two lesbian moms
and two gay dads. See Kimberly Mistsyn, Brave New Family, in HOME FRONTS:
CONTROVERSIES IN NONTRADITIONAL PARENTING 185 (Jess Wells ed., 2000)
(describing her family with one biological mom and her partner, and one sperm-donor
dad and his partner).
5
For discussion of the use of the new technologies, see Kyle C. Velte, Egging on
Lesbian Maternity: The legal Implications of Tri-Gametic In Vitro Fertilization, 7 AM.
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 431, 436 n. 24 (1998/99).
6
See, e.g., Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1986); Thomas S. v.
Robin Y, 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (1994); see also Nancy Polikoff, Breaking the Link
Between Biology and Parental Rights in Planned Lesbian Families: When Semen
Donors are Not Fathers, 2 GEO. J. GENDER & L. __ (forthcoming 2001); Fred A.
Bernstein, This Child Does Have Two Mothers . . .And a Sperm Donor with Visitation,
22 REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1 (1996); M OLLY SHANLEY, M AKING BABIES, MAKING
FAMILIES; WHAT M ATTERS M OST IN AN AGE OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY ,
SURROGACY, ADOPTION , AND SAME-SEX AND SINGE PARENTS’ RIGHTS (forthcoming
2001) (discussing general framework for thinking about the rights of known sperm
providers).
In a recent case, a sperm donor sought additional visitation rights beyond those
to which he had previously agreed in writing. In re Matter of William “TT” v. Siobhon
“HH”, NYLJ, Oct. 2, 2000 (Albany Fam. Ct). The court awarded him additional rights
because the children “were fortunate to have two biological parents [the mother and the
father] who love and care for them.” Courts have a tendency to try to find two parents of
the opposite sex for children. See Naomi Cahn, Reframing Child Custody
Decisionmaking, 58 OHIO ST . L.J. 1 (1997).
7
See Polikoff, supra note 5, at ____.
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doubtful. 8 Where there is an anonymous donor, on the other hand, given the
collection practices of many sperm and egg banks, there may be little information
available about the potential gamete provider. There are a few sperm banks, such
as the Rainbow Flag Health Services Bank, which recruits gay and bisexual
sperm donors and calls itself “A Known Sperm Bank.”9 But, as part of its
services, it asks that the mother contact the sperm donor by the time the child
turns one-year-old; such a requirement may be onerous and cause legal problems,
however, particularly if the sperm donor seeks to establish a relationship with the
child.10 Indeed, many sperm providers want to be involved with the resulting
children. 11 The Sperm Bank of California has a known donor/yes program
through which donors agree to let any resulting children learn their identity when
the children are eighteen years old. 12 This allows couples (or a single parent) to
raise a child together, without the specter of a man claiming paternal rights
suddenly appearing. 13 Similarly, Pacific Reproductive Services, which describes
itself as “lesbian and single -women friendly,” 14 indicates in its donor profiles
whether the donor is willing to be known when the child turns eighteen, or at
least allow the child to see a video of him. 15
In the overwhelming majority of cases involving an unknown donor,
when children begin searching for genetic information, they will be unable to
receive any. While some banks, such as the California Cryobank, allow for the

8

See Velte, supra note 4, at 445, 449; Martha A. McCarthy & Joanna L. Radbord,
Family Law for Same Sex Couples: Chart(er)ing the Course, 15 CAN. J. FAM. L. 101,
130, 131 n. 83 (1998).
9
Rainbow
Flag
Health
Services,
Known
Donor
Insemination
at
www.gayspermbank.com (last visited February 12, 2001).
10
For example, the sperm provider may want to establish a relationship with the child.
See Polikoff, Breaking the Link Between Biology and parental Rights in Planned
Lesbian Families: When Semen Donors are Not Fathers, __ GEO. J. GENDER & L. __
(forthcoming 2000);
11
See Tzivia Gover, Two Years and Counting: Sperm Banks Prepare to Face the Test
of Time, in HOME FRONTS: CONTROVERSIES IN NONTRADITIONAL PARENTING 165, 172
(Jess Wells ed., 2000) (“Director Leland Traiman’s one-man operation [Rainbow Sperm
Bank] . . . collects sperm from donors–mostly gay men–who want to play an uncle-like
role in their offspring’s life.”).
12
See Susan Seligson, Seeds of Doubt: A Successful Donor-Insemination Service
Catering to Heterosexual Single Women and Lesbians Raise Some Difficult Questions,
ATLANTIC M ONTHLY, Mar., 1995, at 28. “About 60 percent of the 3,000 or so vials of
sperm released each year come from “Yes” donors.” Id. “Forty percent of the bank's
donors sign up for the program. Eighty percent of clients request one of them.” 20/20:
Faceless, Nameless Fathers – Donor Offspring Seek Clues About Their Dads, (ABC
television broadcast, Dec. 25, 1998).
13
See Ilene Chaykin, Babes in Arms: Gay Parents Gain Acceptance, L.A. MAG, July 1,
2000 at pg # (commenting on the choice of one lesbian couple to use this alternative).
14
Donor Sperm, Donor Egg, Surrogacy & Embryo Adoption Resources, at
http://www.fertilityplus.org/faq/donor.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2001). Offers "Willingto-be-Known" donors, and is billed as “Lesbian and single-women friendly.”
15
Pacific Reproductive Services, December 2000 Donor Catalogue, at
http://www.hellobaby.com/profiles.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2001). All five donors in
the December 2000 catalogue indicated a willingness to be known.
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release of donor information with mutual consent,16 even this process is difficult,
because it requires the Bank to find the sperm providers many years later. A
reporter who tried to track down California Cryobank Donor No. 5027, whose
sperm resulted in children – one as young as two years old – was unable to find
the Donor, even though the sperm providers are supposed to keep the bank
apprised of their moves.17 This mutual consent process has proven quite difficult
in the adoption context too because neither party may be aware of the other’s
consent.18
In the remainder of this essay, I focus on the relationship between
children, unknown donors, and biological parents. My emphasis is on children
and information, rather than on the possibility of birth parents or known gamete
donors asserting parental rights. In both known and unknown situations, I argue
that children deserve access to information. Although I agree that once an
adoption has been finalized or once known gamete donors have agreed not to
assert parental rights, they should be unable to assert parental rights, the finality
of adoption or gamete provision should not prevent the disclosure of information
about the identity of biological parents and gamete providers to a mature child. 19
The disclosure of this information is not equivalent to recognizing parental rights
and responsibilities for the biological parents. Nor is disclosure solely for
genetically based reasons. Rather, disclosure recognizes the potential relationship
between the child and her biological forebears.
The argument for disclosure, while it may implicate constitutional
interests, is ultimately based on public policy considerations.20 Adoption and
gamete provision are regulated by state and federal law, so the decisions on
whether to allow disclosure is largely left to the legislative, or referenda 21
process. In the adoption area, legislatures have chosen whether to seal birth
certificates and related adoption records based on a balancing of the different
interests involved. In the gamete provision area, the few legislatures that have
16

The Bank’s “Openness Policy” emphasizes the importance of mutual consent before
the release of any information. See California Cryobank, Inc., Openness Policy, at
http://206.117.149.143/openness.cfm?page=3&sub=4 (last visited Feb. 21, 2001).
17
Jonathan Eig, An American Family, OFFSPRING M AG., Dec./Jan. 2001, at 92.
18
See Naomi Cahn & Jana Singer, Adoption, Identity, and the Constitution: The Case
for Opening Closed Records, 2 U. PA. J. CON. L. 150 (1999).
19
For a discussion of children’s maturity, see Catherine J. Ross, An Emerging Right for
Mature Minors to Receive Information, 2 U. PA. CON. L.J. 223 (1999). Children –
particularly as they grow – may have interests that diverge profoundly from those of
their parents. See id. at 225. See generally, Cahn & Singer, supra note 17; Emily Buss,
What Does Frieda Yoder Believe?, 2 U. PA. CON.L.J. 53 (1999).
20
See Cahn & Singer, supra note 17 (arguing that while the right to disclosure should,
perhaps, be conceptualized as a fundamental right, it may not be so recognized under
contemporary judicial formulations of constitutional law). As Catherine Ross notes, the
constitution does protect a right to information in other contexts. See Ross, supra note
19, at 227-233.
The right to receive information, however, “remains a relatively
unexplored aspect of freedom of speech even when adults assert such a claim.” Id. at
230.
21
In Oregon, the decision to allow adoptees access to their birth certificates was
accomplished through a public referendum. Cite

acted, have similarly attempted to balance the different interests involved. My
argument is that the balancing of the affected interests should result in making
birth certificates readily available because the “child’s” interest becomes
paramount when she becomes an adult.
I. INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND FAMILIAL INTERESTS
The needs experienced by adoptees and children of gamete provision for
identifying information are often similar,22 as is the type of information sought.
Adoptees generally seek access to their original birth certificates, which includes
the names of their biological mother and perhaps, their biological father;23
gamete offspring generally want identifying information about the gamete
providers, which may also include names. For instance, under the identityrelease policy of The Sperm Bank of California, the gamete offspring will
receive the provider’s full name, driver’s license number, last known address and
telephone number, and the date and place of the provider’s birth. 24
While not all children will seek this information, it is important to many
of them to be able to access it.25 Not providing this information treats these
children differently from children in traditional nuclear families. While nondisclosure recognizes that one’s parents are the individuals who function as
parents, it denies that these children may be interested in other adults who
contributed to their creation. Children want to know why they have a certain eye
color, where their musical talent comes from, whose sense of humor they have.26
In addition, non-disclosure implies that functional parents would be threatened if
this additional information could be discovered, rather than recognizing the
security and integrity of the functional parent/child bond. The exploration of
these issues specifically in the context of lesbian and gay families is a relatively
new topic, and it is unclear whether children in these families will experience the
desire for information in a manner that is comparable to other adoptees.
Nonetheless, based on the limited information available, it appears that at least
some adoptees and gamete-created children will want to find out the identity of
their birth parents or gamete providers.27 This section discusses information
issues in both adoptive and gametically formed families.
22

See Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to
the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 899 (2000).
23
For a discussion of the issuance of new birth certificates upon adoption, see Joan
Heifetz Hollinger, Aftermath of Adoption: Legal and Social Consequences, in 2
ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE 13-1. (Joan Heifetz Hollinger, ed., 1998).
24
The Sperm Bank of California Donor Insemination Services 6.
25
See David Crary, Many Adoptees Seeking Open Birth Records, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE, Nov. 13, 2000, at P4C.
26
See Nina Burleigh, Are You My Father? Donor-Inseminated Children, 192
REDBOOK, Mar. 1999, at #. (discussing identity issues for children conceived through
donor sperm). While not all of these questions are answered through meeting gamete
providers or adoptive parents – does a sense of humor really come from biology? –
these meetings can provide a sense of security, knowledge, and identity.
27
See, e.g., D. MERILEE CLUNIS & G. DORSEY GREEN, THE LESBIAN PARENTING
BOOK: A GUIDE TO CREATING FAMILIES AND RAISING CHILDREN, 55 (1995).
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A. ADOPTION
The issues of disclosure are perhaps easier to understand when it comes
to adoption because the birth parents (or at least one of them) were involved for a
longer period of time in the creation of the child than were the gamete providers.
Consequently, the need expressed by adoptees to learn about their birth parents
appears somewhat more comprehensible: there were people who explicitly
relinquished their parental rights28 rather than simply providing (or selling)
gametic material.
When children are adopted, they are issued new birth certificates with the
names of their adoptive parent – or parents (when there are second-parent
adoptions), rather than their biological parents. Most states currently have laws
that allow adopted children to access their original birth certificates after going
to court and showing good cause, which has generally been interpreted strictly. 29
However, even such limited access has not always been permitted. While Alaska
and Kansas never sealed their records, most other states did so, beginning in the
early 1900s.30 In the years surrounding World War II, most states began to deny
adoptees access to their birth certificates.31 In fact, in 1960, 60% of the states
explicitly precluded adult adoptees from accessing their birth records.32
Adoption professionals sought to prevent the stigma of illegitimacy from
attaching to either the birth mother or the child,33 an ironic justification today
given the status of LGBT families. Currently, only Oregon, Tennessee,
Delaware, and a few other states, have laws that allow adoptees to obtain their

Felix’s moms had used sperm from an unknown donor . . .. Felix grew up
simply knowing he had a biological father [sic] somewhere in the city and had
not much bothered with that until he hit ten. Then he became desperate to know
who his “father” was and began to pester his moms about finding him. When he
found out they knew who he was, he wanted to meet him.
The authors also point out that there has been no “definitive research” on the question of
whether “alternatively inseminated children reared by lesbian mothers really miss having
a father.” Id. at 54.
28
On the requirements that both biological parents relinquish their rights, see
Hollinger, supra note 24, at 13-1.
29
See id. A birth mother recently petitioned a court to allow her to convey medical
information to her child about the predisposition of the biological parents to a variety of
potentially treatable medical conditions pursuant to the “good cause” exception, and the
court allowed her to proceed. Matter of Baby Boy “SS” v. Rosemarie “TT”, discussed
in John Caher, Court Backs Birth Mother’s Bid to Unseal Adoption Records, N.Y.L.J.
(Jan. 5, 2001).
30
See Elizabeth Samuels The Idea of Adoption: An Inquiry into the History of Adult
Adoptee Access to Birth Records (manuscript at 5).
31
See E. WAYNE CARP , FAMILY M ATTERS: SECRECY AND DISCLOSURE IN THE HISTORY
OF ADOPTION (1998); see also RICKIE SOLINGER, WAKE UP LITTLE SUZIE: SINGLE
PREGNANCY AND RACE BEFORE ROE V. WADE (1992).
32
See Samuels, supra note 31, at 3.
33
See Carp, supra note 32.

records when they become adults without going to court.34 Thus, adoptees in
these states have the same right as anyone else to obtain their original birth
certificates.
Some adoption professionals think that adoptees benefit from openness.35
It is important to distinguish two different meanings of the term openness.
“Open adoption” refers to “adoption-with-contact” or an adoption with the
potential for ongoing contact between the biological parent(s) and the adoptive
parent(s).36 “Open records” refers to the disclosure of information to members
of the adoption triad of records relating to the child’s birth and adoption. Studies
of adoptive parents, biological parents, and adoptees show strong support for
allowing adoptees access to their birth certificates.37
Adult adoptees express health, medical and psychological reasons for
wanting to know their birth parents.38 Genetic essentialism (biogenetic
fundamentalism) is not an accurate label for their interests. Many are searching to
fill in missing parts of their identity,39 for an explanation of why they were
relinquished for adoption, or to reassure their birth parents that they are well. 40
Dissatisfaction with their adoptive lives rarely forms part of their motivation. 41
Like other adoptees, lesbian adoptees generally have a variety of reasons
for searching for their birth mothers:
Jill, a lesbian adoptee in her early twenties, believes that all female
adoptees are looking for a mother . . .Theresa, who is also gay and in her
twenties, says, “my emotional birth was when I met my mother and she
34

See Cahn & Singer, supra note 17, at #. New Zealand is considering legislation,
which would provide for the issuance of two birth certificates upon adoption, one with
the names of the birth parents, one with the names of the adoptive parents, and allow
access to this information to all members of the adoption triad. Mary Longmore, Gay
Men Get Rights in Adoption Overhaul Plan, EVENING POST (Wellington), Sept. 29,
2000, at 3; see also Law Commission, Adoption and Its Alternatives: A Different
Approach and a New Framework 171-173 (Sept. 2000) at http://www.lawcom.govt.nz
(last visited March 28, 2001).
35
See generally Patrick McMahon, Adoptees Demand Right to Past, USA TODAY,
June 25, 1999 at #; David Brodzinsky, et al., BEING ADOPTED : THE LIFELONG SEARCH
FOR SELF (1993); David Brodzinsky, et al., THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOPTION (1993);
BETTY JEAN LIFTON, JOURNEY OF THE ADOPTED SELF: A QUEST FOR WHOLENESS 234
(1994).
36
See, e.g., Annette Appell, Increasing Options to Improve Permanency Considerations
in Drafting an Adoption with Contact Statute, 18 CHILD. LEGAL RT . J. 24, 36-42 (1998).
37
See, e.g., Hollinger, supra note 24, at 13-38-39 (reporting on birth parents).
38
Lisa Belkin, What the Jumans Didn’t Know About Michael, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14,
1999, at 42 (providing a compelling account of one adoptee’s need to learn about his
biological mother’s past).
39
See, e.g., Paul Sachdev, Adoption Reunion and After: A Study of the Search Process
and Experience of Adoptees, 71 CHILD WELFARE 53, 58-59 (1992). In this study of 124
adoptees who had searched and found their biological parents, most adoptees explained
that they were looking for a missing part of their lives to develop a “more cohesive
identity.” Id. at 58.
40
See Sachdev, supra note 42, at 59.
41
See id.; see also Frances Pacheco & Robert Eme, An Outcome Study of the Reunion
Between Adoptees and Biological Parents, 72 CHILD WELFARE 53, 58 (1993).
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didn’t reject me. It was the first day I felt like a human being. Every
other relationship I had fell off the face of the earth.”42
B. CHILDREN FORMED THROUGH GAMETE P ROVISION
As in adoption, the question in gamete provision is: should a child ever
be able to discover the identity of her gamete provider?43 For at least 100 years,
women have become pregnant through insemination of donor sperm. 44 The first
known use of artificial insemination with donor sperm (AID) was performed in
the United States in 1884, although some research suggests it occurred more than
1600 years ago in parts of the Jewish Talmud. 45 The donors are often promised
anonymity by the sperm bank, clinic, or under state statute;46 but, of course, so
were many biological parents of adoptees. The standard for disclosure under the
42

See LIFTON, supra note 37. Surprisingly, there is comparatively little information on
lesbian and gay adoptees and their biological parents. The focus of much of the
adoption literature within the lesbian and gay community is on the basic ability of
LGBT parents to adopt in the first place.
43
See Jeanne Marie Laskas, Left Unsaid, WASH. POST , Mar. 29, 1998, at W35
(reporting on friend who had agreed never to tell anyone about an egg donation, and
who then promptly told her friend, a journalist). It may be difficult to keep the secret
regardless of the parents’ intentions. Moreover, many children who do not look like
their parents or any of their relatives guess that they are not biologically related to their
fathers.
In Sweden, children conceived after 1985 have the right to receive information about the
identity of their sperm donors. In a major study of whether parents told their children
that they had been conceived in this manner, only 52% of the parents either had told, or
intended to tell, their children this information. Claes Gottlieb et al., Disclosure of Donor
Insemination to the Child: The Impact of Swedish Legislation on Couples’ Attitudes, 15
HUM. REP . 2052 (Sept. 2000).
Elizabeth Gibson identifies two issues involved in the secrecy of artificial
insemination: who should be told about the fact of the sperm provider, and what should
be told about the identity of the provider.
See Gibson, supra note 45, at 3
(recommending disclosure).
44
Elizabeth L. Gibson, Artificial Insemination by Donor: Information, Communication
and Regulation, 30 J. FAM. L. 1, 2 (1991-92). The use of “donor” in the gamete area is
problematic. Men who produce sperm are paid for their efforts, and while egg donors
used to be relatives of the donee, egg donors are generally paid at least several thousand
dollars today. See Barbara Vobejda, Egg Donation: A Growing Business: Fertility
Successes Raise Demand, WASH. POST , March 7, 1999, at A1; Kathryn D. Katz, Ghost
Mothers: Human Egg Donation and the Legacy of the Past, 57 ALB. L. REV. 733, 739
(1994).
45
Machelle M. Seibel, Therapeutic Donor Insemination, in FAMILY BUILDING, supra
note 3, at 33-34.
46
For example, the Uniform Parentage Act provides that all documents relating to an
insemination are “subject to inspection only upon an order of the court for good cause
shown.”
Uniform Parentage Act § 5(a), 9b U.L.A.(1987); see CA. CODE
§7613(a)(2001)(“good cause”); COL. REV. STAT . ANN. §19-4-107 (2000)(“good
cause”); N.J. STAT . ANN. §9:17-44a (2000) (“compelling reasons clearly and
convincingly shown”); O. REV. STATE § 677.365 (1999)(“may be opened only upon an
order of a court of competent jurisdiction”): WYO. STAT . § 14-2-103(a)(2000)(“good
cause).

Uniform Parentage Act of information concerning sperm donors is “good cause,”
the same standard applicable in the adoption area. However, some state
legislatures have permitted disclosure of the identity of biological parents without
the requirement of a court order. Courts have explained that the state is free to
make this change based on public policy considerations.47
Because of the new reproductive technologies, women can donate eggs
to other women or for surrogates. In 1996, there were more than 5,000 cases of
egg donation. 48 Egg donation provides a workable option for gay men who want
to raise a child. For example, Nadine Scott donated an egg to be carried by a
surrogate mother on behalf of a gay male couple who had been trying to acquire
children for more than nine years.49 There has been a proliferation of genetic and
gestational arrangements,50 and an emergence of legal issues regarding access to
information.
The issue of secrecy and gamete provision is highly problematic. There
are both similarities and differences to issues surrounding secrecy and adoption,
and, there are a series of special issues for LGBT families. The history of
secrecy surrounding gamete provision is perhaps more complicated than that
concerning adoption: sperm providers are often promised anonymity51 and may
have relied on that promise in agreeing to provide sperm. Similarly, while the
identity of egg providers was often well-known in early cases, there is now more
anonymity and secrecy attached to this process as well. Moreover, the intending
parents in gamete provision cases have generally been subject to much less
pressure to disclose the biological background of their children than have
adoptive parents, who have been counseled to tell their children that they are
adopted.
For the child, the interests in finding out more information about her
gamete providers may be similar to those of adoptees’ needs for information. 52
Not all children will want access to this information, but many want to know
where they came from. Indeed, while the children may not want a long-term
relationship with their gamete providers, many experience curiosity. 53 One guide
to lesbian parenting explains that children may “grieve never knowing their
biological father.”54 The book encourages the mother(s) to “hang in there” while

47

See, e.g., Doe v. Sundquist, 2 S.W.3d 919 (Tenn. 1999) (“We have held, however,
that the confidentiality of records is a statutory matter left to the legislature.”).
48
Vobejda, supra note 45, at A1(citing Centers for Disease Control statistics).
49
Meghan Daum, Baby Gift, HARPER’S BAZAAR, Apr. 1, 2000, at 22.
50
See Velte, supra note 4.
51
It appears that state law did not actually regulate this promise of nondisclosure;
similarly, in the adoption context, state law never guaranteed complete anonymity to the
biological parents.
52
See Garrison, supra note 13, at 899; Burleigh, supra note 27, at #. (discussing
identity issues for children conceived through donor sperm).
53
Susan Kastner, How Do You Tell Kids “Daddy” is Donor Sperm?, TORONTO STAR,
May 30, 1998, at pg. #. (discussing the difficulties faced by mothers and fathers dealing
with children’s curiosity).
54
See CLUNIS & GREEN, supra note 28 at 55.

10

the child works through her feelings, and analogizes their situation to those in
which children have lost a parent through divorce.55
Several studies have examined whether donor offspring experience
identity problems that are similar to those of adopted children, and while the
studies often conflict, they do indicate that at least some donor children
experience a sense of loss for not having information about their biological pasts
or being able to establish a relationship with their gamete providers.56 In fact, a
number of groups are forming to work on the issues that the children and their
parents confront.57 In one study of children who were not told until they were
adults that they were born through donor insemination, the (now adult) children
explained that they were experiencing problems of personal identity in
conjunction with some hostility towards their families for not disclosing their
origins.58
On the other hand, issues of “relinquishment” or “abandonment” seem
far less complex because a child may find it easier to understand someone who
simply provided sperm or eggs in exchange for money, rather having “given up”
a baby for adoption. Thus, “donor” children may face easier psychological issues
surrounding their origins, and knowing the identity of their genetic parents may
be less central to their sense of self. Even these children, however, sometimes
express strong interest in meeting their biological relatives.59 An article in
Redbook describes the search of one woman who tracked down her sperm
provider father to the ob/gyn office where he practiced medicine. He refused to
talk about whether he might have provided the sperm. But, she explained, “[I]t
still bothers me. There are a lot of identity issues. Who am I? Who do I take
after?”60 Another woman expressed uncertainty at what language to use to
describe herself: “I’m unsure about what words to use. Do we refer to ourselves
as DI adoptees: do we say conceived or produced? There is an element of being
produced.”61 Some search crowds, looking for half-siblings, knowing that the
same sperm donor could have helped in the birth of many children. 62
55
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19, 1998 at #(providing contact information for The Donor Conception Support Group
of Australia).
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See id.
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See Burleigh, supra note 27, at #.
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See Eccleston, supra note 59 at #.
62
Mary Linton, Donor Offspring Believe They Have a Right to Know Their Biological
Identity, TORONTO LIFE, Sept. 13, 2000, at #.
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Gamete donors also face highly complex issues. Like birth parents after
adoption, gamete donors lack a legal relationship with their “children.”63 Under
the current system, sperm donors generally expect anonymity. Moreover, sperm
donation is not a particularly complex process that requires intensive
involvement from the provider, although many sperm banks require repeat visits
over a substantial period of time to ensure the quality of the sperm. While it has
been assumed that sperm donors will have rela tively little interest in meeting the
resulting children, this is not accurate, especially given the growing number of
banks that do allow for identifiability of donors. In a New Zealand study of
thirty-nine sperm donors who had been guaranteed anonymity, almost two-thirds
of the men were either “strongly interested” or “interested” in meeting children
conceived with their sperm. 64 Newspapers similarly report that some sperm
providers are interested in meeting their “offspring.”65
For women who provide eggs, the process of egg extraction is far less
burdensome and relationship-building than is the process of being pregnant and
carrying a child for nine months. Nonetheless, some egg donors, who have
undergone more invasive procedures may have forged a bond with the recipient
family.66 Egg donors may even have contracts that require their permission for
future disposition of the eggs.67 Thus, the initial presumption in the medical
community that egg donation would be treated like sperm donation is somewhat
more problematic in the context of egg donation, which began by using identified
donors. The identified donors were often related to the recipients, and programs
referred to themselves as “BYOD,” which stood for “bring your own donor.”68
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N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1997, at 34 (discussing the importance of egg donors not thinking
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donating blood).
67
See, e.g., Litowitz v. Litowitz, 10 P.3d 1086 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000). The contract
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All eggs produced by the Egg Donor pursuant to this Agreement shall be
deemed the property of the Intended Parents and as such, the Intended Parents
shall have the sole right to determine the disposition of said egg (s). In no event
may the Intended Parents allow any other party the use of said eggs without
express written permission of the Egg Donor.
Id. at 1093.
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Andrea Mechanik Braverman, Understanding the Disclosure/Non-Disclosure
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As the use of egg donation has increased, however, anonymity has become a part
of the process.69
For the intending parents, issues involving anonymity are quite complex.
For example, Tzivia Gover explained her decision to mother a child that was
biologically related to her partner and to a sperm donor. She said:
When I was deciding to have a child in the ‘80s the idea of secrecy
surrounding the donor suited me fine. . . . . As far as I was concerned, our
child would have two parents, my partner and me–and that was that.
Now that my daughter is nearing 11, time and experience have
complicated my vision of the donor’s role in her life, and I am relieved
that we chose a route that will allow us to help point her in the right
direction should she one day want to find him.
Still, I can’t help wonder at the plethora of options these days. If
it is true that a donor is, as so many of us tell our children, just a nice
man who donated his seed so we could start a family, would we really
need to gather round the television set to watch him on video?. . .
Although sperm bank personnel–and even most lesbian moms I’ve
spoken with–say more information helps curb fantasies about a Donor
Dad in Shining Armor, I wonder.70
Some intending mothers may choose to contact others who have used the
same sperm provider, thus allowing children who are genetically related to meet
each other, and providing some sort of extended family for both the parents and
the children. Indeed, after five women who used the same donor recently
introduced themselves and their seven children to each other, their children asked
if they would be able to see their “new relatives” again and the mothers liked
“the idea of building a communal extended family.”71
As adoption law changes, so too may the laws surrounding the secrecy of
gamete providers.72 I think it is easier to see the connection between a birth
mother and her child than between gamete providers and their children. Birth
mothers have begun to speak up about their strong interests in knowing their
children, and their feelings of attachment, and they now have more control over
the adoption process (rather than in bygone days when some women were even
blindfolded in the birthing room to prevent the formation of any attachment).73
In contrast, there has been no corresponding movement among gamete providers,
reflecting, perhaps, their lack of emotional investment in their genetic
contributions. The casualness with which gamete providers go about their
business is unsettling. While they should not be saddled with parental rights and
obligations when they so clearly intend not to become parents and there are
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OOCYTES, supra note 34, at pg #. (need year and publisher)
73
See SOLINGER, supra note 32 at #.

70

others who so clearly intend to become parents, the “products”74 of their business
may not see their creation in quite so businesslike a manner. Some participants of
gamete provision have even attempted to engineer an absence of relationship
between the gamete providers and the resulting child – some gay male couples,
for example, have separate egg providers and surrogates to attenuate the
connections with the resulting child – but this may not work for the child, the
intending parent, or even for the gamete provider. Based on current medical
technology, an egg provider and the recipient must synchronize their
reproductive schedules, a hormonally-intensive procedure.75
On the other hand, “open” gamete donation, where the providers and the
intending parents are known and would like continued contact, remains an
option. For instance, both Nadine Scott, the egg provider, and the surrogate,
have become friendly with the gay male couple who are the intending parents,
and the couple has encouraged Ms. Scott to be as involved as she chooses.76 This
parallels developments in the adoption context, where adoption-with-contact has
become an increasingly popular option. 77
Finally, the issues of state involvement in gamete provision differ. Only
nine states currently protect the anonymity of gamete donors,78 while virtually all
states protect the secrecy of biological parents.79 Adoption is also a state-created
legal process, while gamete donation remains a largely private transaction that is
handled through contract and intention80 with virtually no uniform regulation. 81
74
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The anonymity of gamete donors is more likely to be protected through private
contracts. State-imposed disclosure requirements that impair these contracts may
raise additional legal issues. States have just begun to think about issues
involving egg provision because the process is so new.82 Few states, however,
have addressed issues regarding the rights and responsibilities of egg providers.83
On the other hand, thirty-five states have at least partially addressed the parental
rights and responsibilities where gamete provision is involved. 84 For example,
the Uniform Parentage Act, which has been adopted by 19 states, provides: “If,
under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of her
husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen donated by a man not her
husband, the husband is treated in law as if he were the natural father of a child
thereby conceived. The husband's consent must be in writing and signed by him
and his wife.”85 Obviously, donor insemination of any woman not married to a
“husband” is left uncovered by this law.86
II. DISCLOSURE AND LGBT FAMILIES
There are some issues specific to same-sex relationships that make
disclosure of gamete donation very different from the situation opposite-sex
couples face, and suggest that disclosure of a child’s biological origins may not
be as divisive an issue within the community or for individual parents. First,
when children learn that men make sperm and women make eggs, they realize
that two men or two women (or a single woman or a single man) cannot make a
baby themselves.87 Thus, given that the initial secrecy over the process itself is
already dissolved,88 that makes it easier for children to ask questions about the
identity of the gamete provider. In addition, one study of lesbian couples and
single women using donor insemination found that all of the women intended to
tell their children their status, and that 57% wanted either to meet with donor
themselves or have their child meet the donor.89 Moreover, unlike the situation
of many heterosexual parents, lesbian and gay parents must generally engage in
82
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85
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March 28, 2001).
86
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See Shanley, supra note 5, at #.
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(“Data regarding single women and lesbian couples who have children via DI indicate
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extensive planning before they are able to acquire children. 90 Given that their
families already differ from the generic heterosexual nuclear family, lesbian and
gay parents may find it easier to disclose not just the fact of gamete provision but
also the identity of the provider. In its study of sperm sample recipients, the
Sperm Bank of California found that many women used its identity release
program to make their children’s lives easier with respect to their identity issues
and the situation of having two mothers.91 The mothers wanted their children to
have the option of learning this information.
secrecy is not a viable option in these cases.
Interestingly enough, women are more likely to disclose than are men,
regardless of what type of gamete has been provided. 92 One mother, counseled
not to disclose that her child was the result of sperm provision, asserts that the
secrecy norm is “‘the work of male doctors colluding with infertile males to
protect male donors.’”93 Indeed, one physician recently explained: “Anonymity
is a tool that protects the social and psychological construct of the family
resulting from gamete donation, especially enhancing the social paternal role of
the male in the recipient couples in the case of sperm donation.”94
By contrast, for opposite-sex intending parents, there may be even more
secrecy surrounding gamete donation than adoption. While many heterosexual
parents disclose that their children are adopted, parents are much less likely to
disclose, first, that their children were conceived through gamete donation, and
second, any information about the gamete provider. Physicians involved in the
gamete donation process believe that many parents do not plan to tell their
children that they are not biologically related to both parents.95 In a recent study
of parents who conceived children through gamete donation, more than one-half
of the parents surveyed did not intend to disclose this information to their
children, while slightly more than one-third expected to do so. 96 Similarly,
90
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another study that surveyed the attitudes of reproductive endocrinologists found
that 56% of the doctors did not believe that children should be informed of their
biological origins.97 The secrecy often stems from efforts to protect family
members from the stigma of male infertility and the general difficulty of
discussing sperm itself, although there are additional explanations for the secrecy
as well. 98
Another issue unique to children born into a same-sex family deals with
the fact that their families are non-traditional. The concept that the gamete donor
might be important to the child could seem to be an attempt to reify the oppositesex family; a child's family is not really complete unless she has not just two
moms (or two dads) but also a "parent" of the opposite sex from her parents.
However, some dangers of disclosure exist for same-sex couples that are not
relevant for opposite-sex couples. For example, if a lesbian couple uses a nongay identified sperm provider, the provider may be homophobic.99 Other
significant issues surrounding the concept of revealing the donor's identity
concern fears that this is an attempt to assimilate the family into the stereotypical
nuclear family. This is part of what happens when courts award visitation or
paternal rights to men who have donated sperm and explicitly agreed not to seek
further contact with the child — courts are saying that each child needs a mom
and a dad, at the least.100
III. GENETIC ESSENTIALISM
Focusing on biological identity raises the danger of genetic essentialism,
or genetic determinism, a concept which suggests that a person is merely the sum
of her genes, and behavior can be predicted based on genetic information. 101 As
Professor Dorothy Nelkin and Susan Lindee explain, “DNA in popular culture
functions, in many respects, as a secular equivalent of the Christian soul . .
STERILITY 83 (1997). Indeed, Fairfax Cryobank reports that 80% of married couples
want a donor who resembles the husband. Leslie Milk, Looking for Mr. Good Genes,
WASHINGTONIAN, May 1999, at 65. While this does not necessarily indicate that there
will be no disclosure, it certainly facilitates non-disclosure because a child will be less
likely to ask questions.
97
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physicians advise couples never to reveal the circumstances of their children’s
conception.”).
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requisite heterosexually composed dyadic formation that is parenthood.”).
101
Id. at 320-321.

Fundamental to identity, DNA seems to explain individual differences, moral
order, and human fate . . . relevant to the problems of personal authenticity.”102
The gene has been seen as the “unifying concept” of the field of biology, with a
virtually “iconic status” that makes it capable of explaining us to ourselves.103
Critics have accused open records advocates of endorsing such essentialism and
of asserting that blood kinship is superior to adoptive relationships.104
Although I advocate the disclosure of the biological parents’ identity, I
do not justify it because of the genetic information that it will provide.105 Genetic
information, while potentially helpful, does not reveal everything about a
person’s identity. What this information can do, however, is aid children who
feel a connection to a biological past.
The mere knowledge of one’s genetic information is not, by itself,
determinative of one’s identity, or even of one’s physical reality. “Genes play
some role in all disease, but environment plays a role as well, even with genetic
diseases.”106 Knowing that a parent has developed cancer, heart disease, or
depression does not definitively indicate that the child will also. 107 Genes do not
tell us about a person’s culture, family, friends, or moral beliefs.108 Acquiring
genetic information does not allow an adoptee or a child of gamete provision to
predict, or even to explain, all of her personal characteristics and traits. For
example, studies of adoptees whose biological parents were alcoholics shows a
much higher than normal risk that the adopted children will also become
alcoholics.109 On the other hand, 82% of these children did not become
alcoholics. Moreover, studies of female adoptees of alcoholic birth parents do not
indicate the same pattern. 110 Genes are complex and can only be understood in a
larger biological and social context.111 Nonetheless, a genetic history does
contain useful information about potential medical conditions, and it may provide
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some grounding for those children who want to know, helping them shape future
behavior.
Wanting to know about one’s genetic history does not, then, mean that
every aspect of one’s life will suddenly be explained. Instead, having the same
genetic heritage creates the opportunity for a connection between parent and
adult child that the state must not foreclose. As Professor James Nelson points
out, “Why . . . regard a biological connection to the future as a vital part of the
identity of adults, but not see biological connectedness to the past as an equally
vital part of the identity of children?”112 Given the importance to many parents
of having a genetic connection to their child, it should be unremarkable that
children are themselves interested in learning about those to whom they have a
genetic connection. In the case of gamete provision, where couples establish a
genetic attachment between one of them and a child, it should not be surprising
that children would want to know about other aspects of their genetic heritage.
If finding genetic information was the primary motivation for searching,
then adoptees would seek equally both birth parents; in fact, however, adoptees
are generally more interested in finding their birth mothers.113 Thus, genetics
provides only a partial explanation for the search process.
It is ironic that adoption law increasingly mandates extensive disclosure
of non-identifying medical and related information but has largely ignored the
calls for disclosure of identifying information. State statutes are quite broad in
the type of information that must be disclosed in connection with an adoption. 114
Similarly, the forms gamete providers must fill out are extremely detailed with
respect to their family health histories, and much of this information is disclosed
to potential recipients. Sperm providers frequently undergo extensive screening
as well as a complete physical examination. 115 Recipients can choose egg or
sperm providers based on specified number of traits. For example, it is possible
to choose race, ethnic ancestry, height, weight, physical build, hand coordination,
vision, approximate IQ score, and college grade point average for egg
providers.116 Cryogenic Laboratories offers the following: “Simply send us a
photo of the individual you would hope for your offspring to resemble. Our staff
112
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will then rank the resemblance of the donors you’ve selected.”117 The bank may
even collect an audiotape of the providers.118
This full disclosure of anonymous information at the time of gamete
provision – information that goes well beyond simple genes – along with
corresponding secrecy of the identity of the person to whom the information
corresponds, seems itself to be a potential example of genetic essentialism on
behalf of the intending parents. They do not want to know the actual person;
they simply want to know her/his genes and a great deal of other information as
well. A primary rationale for requiring disclosure of non-identifying genetic
information is to allow prospective adoptive parents or gamete recipients to
guard against any dangers that might be posed through “faulty” genes. As a
secondary rationale, sperm banks report that many of their clients are looking for
a good genetic match: “Sperm banks have found that most of their clients seek
donors who share their ethnic background and personal interests.”119 In a recent
HBO television program, Ellen DeGeneres expresses frustration with the process
of seeking a sperm donor who looks like her.120 Indeed, lesbian couples seem to
be as interested as heterosexual couples in attempting to match the sperm
provider’s characteristics with those of the non-biologically-related partner.121
By contrast, the purpose of disclosing the identity of biological relatives is to aid
the adoptees and the various parents in their personal and emotional
development, not solely to provide genetic information (although this may be an
important by-product).122 Indeed, a birth mother recently petitioned a court so
that she inform the adoptive family of various predispositions towards medical
conditions.123
Ultimately, the reasons that adoptees or gamete children seek
information goes far beyond genetically-related rationales.
The information
provides additional background to their full identities –genetic, emotional, and
even cultural. Regardless of how happy children are, and have been, in their
117
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families, they still may want and need additional information. Adoptees who
have searched and found their birth mothers generally report a more positive selfperception together with a more holistic sense of identity. 124
IV. PRIVACY INTERESTS
The primary arguments against information disclosure center on the
privacy rights of everyone involved: the adoptive parents, the biological parents,
the gamete providers, and the child. Elsewhere, I have extensively analyzed
these rights,125 so I will simply provide a brief summary. The argument against
providing identifying information relies, in large part, on the history of
nondisclosure, and on the use of nondisclosure to protect the interests of all
involved in the process. For example, Jeremiah Gutman, who has represented
birth mothers and is the former chair of the American Civil Liberties Union’s
privacy committee, argues that if birth mothers “cannot rely upon the adoption
agency or attorney and the law to protect her privacy, and to conceal her identity
for all time,” she may decide not to place a child for adoption. 126
First, the history of secrecy in adoption provides contrary evidence
concerning the need to protect the privacy of all members of the adoption triad.
Records were originally sealed in order to prevent a prying public from receiving
information about a child’s legitimacy, not to prevent members of the adoption
triad from getting information about each other.127 Moreover, the only two states
that do not seal their adoption records have lower abortion rates and higher
adoption rates than the national average.128
Second, the traditional articulation of the fundamental right to privacy
does not comprehend the various interests at stake in the adoption cases. The
cases’ discussion of personhood and privacy provide conflicting notions of
whose rights and interests merit protection at any one time.129 The whole notion
of privacy – the right to be let alone – has developed as protection for individuals
from state interference; because adoption is a state-created status involving
relationship within and between families, the traditional formulation of the
doctrine is problematic. For gamete and egg donors, the privacy interests should
be analyzed in a similar fashion,130 that is, with a recognition that the state has
been – or should be – involved in defining their status as parents or as nonparents as well as the secrecy of their identities.
124
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The term “privacy” includes a series of different “rights,” some of which
have been recognized by the federal constitution, some of which have developed
in other contexts.131 In his new book, Jeffrey Rosen argues that in the
reproductive rights area, the Supreme Court has labeled as privacy what is better
conceived of as an individual’s right to make reproductive decisions, in contrast
to a “more focused vision of privacy that has to do with our ability to control the
conditions under which we make different aspects of ourselves accessible to
others.”132 Disclosure of the identity of sperm and egg providers implicates both
aspects of “privacy,” the interests of the ultimate parent(s) in making intimate
reproductive choices, and the interests of the gamete providers in controlling the
circumstances under which they become – or do not become – known. In
addition, disclosure implicates a third kind of privacy, the interests of the child in
the choice of whether to learn more about herself.133
Some birth parent advocates have analogized the adoption/gamete
provision decision to that made by women choosing to undergo an abortion,
claiming the same right to privacy protects both. 134 The argument is that there is
a fundamental right to make decisions regarding reproductive choices without
intervention.
This argument works very well in the abortion context, when a woman is
deciding what to do with her own body. It works much less well when, after a
woman or a man has decided what to do with her or his body, there is now a
child with separate and independent needs and interests who is deciding what to
do with her body. Children have independently recognized rights that exist apart
from, and sometimes in conflict with, those of their (different sets of) parents.135
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In one of the first cases to deal with the disclosure of the identity of a
sperm donor, the court crafted a compromise.136 The parents of an 11-year-old
girl with a rare kidney disorder sued California Cryobank, which the parents
allege provided them with the defective sperm that lead to the kidney disease. As
part of their suit, the Johnsons sought to depose the donor himself, who has
resisted, claiming that disclosure would infringe his privacy interests. The
donor’s privacy claims were grounded in the contract between the Johnsons and
Cryobank, which states that his identity will not be disclosed, as well as in the
California and federal constitutions.137 The court held that the absolute
prohibition in the contract was contrary to public policy, which allowed for
disclosure based upon “good cause,” and although the court recognized a limited
constitutional right to privacy under the California constitution, it held that the
identity could be disclosed. Given the particular circumstances of the case,
however, the court directed that the donor be deposed without ever revealing his
identity.
The analogies between the donor’s claim to privacy and those claims
asserted in the adoption context are quite strong. In both cases, there is a claim
of a promise of confidentiality, and there is a claim that disclosing information
violates privacy interests. With both cases, state statutes have typically specified
that disclosure is available upon a showing of “good cause,” and ultimately,
courts have decided that good cause can sometimes trump these privacy interests.
In this country, a provider’s privacy claims are generally based on
promises made in connection with a sale. There are actually two sales
transactions: a sperm bank typically pays $50 for each ejaculation,138 and, in turn,
sells that sperm to the intending parents.139 A woman can sell her eggs to an in
vitro fertilization program for $2500-5000, although some programs offer much
more money. 140 By allowing the sale of sperm and eggs, we are, in a sense,
treating them and their ultimate “product” as a commodity. 141 The Johnson court
136
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rejected the donor’s claim to a physician-patient privilege because there was no
evidence that the donor ever consulted the Cryobank for medical diagnosis and
treatment; the donor instead sought merely to make money from the sale of his
sperm and was thus not subject to the protections offered by the privilege. Sale
of the good did not subject him to the same privacy rights. While we might think
differently about privacy in connection with a sale of “goods” than in connection
with a sale of “personhood,” 142 treating sperm and eggs as the sale of goods
might help allay concerns about the identity of the providers. This is an example
of how the concept of commodification may be useful because it allows us to
separate out the “good” from the privacy interests of the provider. If we view
gametes as commodities, this should diminish privacy concerns. And, the mere
ascription of financial value to these items, the mere use of commodification
discourse, does not necessarily destroy all other values that they may contain. 143
The Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine has
defended payment for eggs, explaining that payment does not discourage the
provider’s altruistic motivations and also promotes fairness to the providers144
Of course, even as we permit eggs and sperm to be sold, there remain
additional concerns about the “purveyors” of these goods as well as the
underlying validity of permitting sale of these “goods.” Just as in the surrogacy
context, the providers may be devaluing themselves145 (as well as their
commodities). Not allowing sperm and eggs to be sold might be the appropriate
response that prevents exploitation and also acknowledges the significance of
providing gametes. While commodification may be useful conceptually in
allaying privacy concerns, I remain concerned about allowing the sale of these
particular commodities. Removing the financial incentive might cause donors to
understand the significance of their actions to their “offspring.”
As a policy matter, is this type of transaction entitled to secrecy?
Perhaps the answer is yes, except to all of those involved in the transaction itself:
the bank, the intending parents, and the child. Just as the initial move to secrecy
in adoption records was not designed to protect against disclosure within the
relationship, the protection accorded to gamete donors should not extend to
disclosure to anyone not directly involved in the “transaction.” The information
could remain private, a secret shared only by the child, her parents, and the
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provider. Identifying information could be released, upon request, once the
gamete offspring reach 18, or through a confidential intermediary system that
would allow for national searches. States should guarantee the release of such
information to mature adults through laws that would preempt private agreements
(such as between the gamete provider and the intending parents or between the
gamete provider and a gamete bank) to the contrary. 146 Although all states have
addressed this issue for adoptees,147 few states have considered legislation on
disclosure of the identity of gamete providers.
V. SUPPLY AND DEMAND
One of the primary arguments against disclosure of the identity of gamete
providers is that it will have a negative effect on the supply of sperm. If sperm
providers know that they may be found, then they may be less likely to give
gametic material out of fear that an unknown child will come knocking on
their door twenty years later, while current practices appear to protect their
ongoing anonymity. Such reluctance might make it even more difficult to
obtain sperm. Indeed, after Sweden enacted legislation in 1985, which
mandated the identification of gamete providers when the child reached the
age of eighteen, there was some concern that the legislation had caused a
decline in the number of sperm donors.148 According to more recent data,
however, there appears to be an increase in the number of sperm providers.149
It appears then, that the requirement that children receive access to donor
information will not necessarily result in a dramatic decrease in donors.150 In
the adoption context, the two states that never sealed their birth certificates
have adoption rates higher than the national average 151 ; disclosure itself has not
served as the deterrent that opponents fear. The same concern about supply
146
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has also been made in the context of banning payment for gametic material,
but here again, the actual impact is uncertain. 152 Moreover, the risk of a
temporary shortage in gametic material is amply balanced by the benefits to
gamete donor children by having access to this information. While sale of
gametes may be a commercial transaction for the seller, it has much broader
implications for the children ultimately created; it is their interests, and, in
many cases, the interests of their parents, which are respected through a
disclosure regime.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, and ironically, a failure to disclose the identity of birth
parents or gamete providers reinforces the notion of the “exclusive”153 and
traditional family. It suggests that biological parents can and should play no
role in their offspring’s lives. It suggests that recognizing a child’s need for
disclosure threatens parental rights. And, it denies the possibilities for
connection that biology can create. The secrecy surrounding adoption
developed during a period of pronatalism, a celebration of the nuclear family
and of heterosexual motherhood and a corresponding condemnation of single
mothers.154 It is emblematic of the attempt to make adoptive, or gamete,
families “look like” other families, to create the family “‘as if’” it had been
biologically created. 155 LGBT families challenge his ideology simply through
their existence. Allowing for the release of identifying information is a
rejection of a system which reifies the traditional “as if” family.
Even under a system of full disclosure, there certainly remains a
distinction between “parenting” a child, and contributing to the creation of the
child.156 The parents have a fundamental right to the control, care, and custody
of their children;157 allowing information disclosure to adults respects parental
rights to raise children as they see fit while the children are minors, but
152
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respects the “children’s” rights once they are mature. While the rights and
interests of biological parents and gamete providers should be accorded
respect, a child should be entitled to receive information about the people who
helped to create her, her birth parents or gamete providers. Such a right should
be established both retroactively and prospectively,158 so adult offspring who
today want information about their biological backgrounds are able to obtain it,
and prospective adoptions and gamete provision arrangements should proceed
in a legal context in which it is understood that offspring will have access to
information once they become adults. States need to enact legislation, and
courts need to establish precedent for allowing disclosure. Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse has suggested, in the context of transracial adoption, the need for a
child to be able to “claim her ‘identity of origin,’ defined as a right to know
and explore, commensurate with her evolving capacity for autonomy, her
identity as a member of the family and group into which she was born.”159
Applying this notion more generally in the adoption and gamete provision
context, mature offspring in these families similarly need access to the ability
to explore their biological families of origin.
Failing to disclose this information also, and again ironically, values
contract over connection. 160 We imagine that explicit contracts, between
gamete providers and gamete banks, between biological parents and adoption
agencies, and implicit contracts, between the ultimate parents, the biological
parents, and the state, guaranteeing secrecy, are more important than the
children’s needs for information, or the biological parent’s later needs for
contact. We live in a culture that respects kinship based on blood ties.161 It is
perfectly possible and completely desirable to challenge conceptions of
families based solely on blood by emphasizing intention and nurture. Yet, in
recognizing the formation and continuity of LGBT families through practice
and intent, it is also important to acknowledge that genetic ties are important
for a variety of reasons that do not threaten the integrity of functional families.
This is an example, both literally and figuratively, of the “second
generation” of issues involved in LGBT family formation. While the fight for
recognition of LGBT families as families, with parents entitled to their full
rights as parents is utterly critical because of their intent and their right to
158
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become parents, we should also take account of the potential needs for children
in these families to learn the identity of the people who contributed to their
creation. As children grow older, not only do they more directly confront
issues concerning their own personality development, but also their rights to
information mature. Without essentializing the notion of genetic connection,
children may still want to know where they came from.
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